

Introduction

In September 2019, the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) established a Working Group (WG) on capital flows, to analyse

- (a) changing patterns in the **composition** and **dynamics** of capital flows,
- (b) macroeconomic and, in particular, the financial stability implications of these changes.

The analysis is based on recent policy reports, academic literature, the WG's roundtable discussions, its central bank survey, and own empirical analyses.


Outline of the report and this presentation

- Chapter 1: Trends since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC)
- Chapter 2: Drivers of gross capital inflows and sudden stops
- Chapter 3: Benefits and risks
- Chapter 4: Policy tools and lessons

Trends of capital flows since the GFC

- Capital flows throughout the world increased rapidly between 2002 and 2007, when they totaled 12 trillions of USD (22% of global GDP). These flows diminished abruptly during the GFC and recovered afterwards without reaching the pre-GFC levels.
- Emerging Markets (EMEs) flows have held up relatively well post GFC (China in particular); flows to Advanced Economies (AE) remained below pre-GFC levels.

Capital flows by type and region




AEs = advanced economies; EMEs = emerging markets; Financial centres = Hong Kong SAR and Singapore; Emerging Asia = CN, IN, ID, MY, PK, PH, TH; Emerging Europe = CZ, HU, PL, RO, RU, TR; Latin America = AR, BR, CL, CO, MX, PE; Middle East and Africa = EG, SA, KW, QA, ZA.

Sources: IMF, Balance of Payment Statistics; CGFS Working Group calculations.

Trends of capital flows since the GFC

• Change in composition: increasing share flows through portfolio investors rather than banks.



Sources: IMF, International Investment Position Statistics, IMF, World Economic Outlook, BIS locational banking statistics (by residence); CGFS Working Group calculations.

- EME flows have held up well post GFC (China in particular).
- More local currency issuance by EMEs sovereigns.
- Foreign investors participation in local debt markets has been shrinking since 2014.
- In regards to volatility of capital flows, some consider it decreased post GFC. However, the central banks' survey shows that most participants believe volatility has increased.
- Less stable nature of foreign direct investment (FDI), mostly reflecting activity by multi-nationals.

Latin America = AR, BR, CL, CO, MX, PE; Middle East and Africa = EG, SA, KW, QA, ZA.

Fuentes: FMI, Balance of Payment Statistics; cálculos del CGFS Working Group


Trends of capital flows since the GFC

Capital flows by type and region


As a percentage of world GDP

Inflows to EME regions

AEs = Advanced economies; EMEs = Emerging economies; Financial centres = Hong Kong SAR y Singapur; Emerging Asia = CN, IN, ID, MY, PK, PH, TH; Emerging Europe = CZ, HU, PL, RO, RU, TR;




Total EM debt in local currency is growing while non-residents' share is falling



Drivers of capital flows

Global push factors


- Shifts in the **risk appetite** have been an important driver of capital flows to EMEs.
- Marginal changes in unprecedented levels of **global liquidity** (proxied by AE monetary policy) have had only a limited effect on the capital inflows.
- Significant changes in global **liquidity** can trigger sudden stops (eg Taper Tantrum).



Drivers of capital flows

Pull factors

- Good local **fundamentals** can reduce the likelihood of a sudden stop.
- Institutions less important (as many EMEs "graduated").
- Participants in WG roundtables with private sector asset managers pointed out that their investment decisions have been shifting towards differentiation at the country level from broad asset classes of country types.



¹ AEs: AU, BE, CA, CH, DE, EA, ES, FR, GB, IT, JP, LU, NL, NZ, SE, and US. ² EMEs: AR, BR CN, CL, CO, HK, IN, KR, MX, MY, PE, PH ,RU, SA, SG, TH, TR, and ZA.


Source: CGFS Working Group, Survey on changing patterns of capital flows, August 2020, questions 6a and 7.

Drivers of capital flows

<u>Pipes</u>

- More local currency issuance by EMEs sovereigns, but USD generally remains dominant.
 - The **investors base** became **more diversified** and **local financial markets developed**, fostering the issuance of debt in local currency by governments.
 - Investment strategies based on index bonds or index equities can exacerbate herd behavior and contagion across economies.
- Less stable nature of FDI, mostly reflecting activity by multi-nationals.


Index inclusion and capital flows



Source: CGFS Working Group, Survey on changing patterns of capital flows, August 2020, question 8b, 8d, and 8f.

Benefits and risks from capital flows

- More definite conclusions on benefits than in the 2009 CGFS report, partly based on more data and identification techniques.
- Both AEs and EMEs highlight **real** and **financial** benefits in the survey.
- Having foreigners buying local currency debt can increase the sensitivity of local financial conditions to shocks originating abroad.





¹ Sensitivity is measured by the slope coefficient of a linear regression of monthly changes in 10-year local currency sovereign bond yields on log changes in the VIX index.

Sources: Survey of central banks; Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED); Bloomberg; CGFS Working Group calculations.

Benefits and risks from capital flows

- Type dependent benefits from capital flows exist, despite of volatility:
 - Bank flows increase funding for local firms, which increases investment, productivity and economic growth, even if they are volatile.
 - **Portfolio flows** associated with issues in local equity markets also increase the sources of funding for investment.
- Risks from capital flows can be classified into three categories:
 - Misallocation of resources across sectors.
 - **FX exchange** effects on financial stability and real activity.
 - Sudden stops.






Key conclusions

- Policies that address short-term vulnerabilities are **no substitute** for long-term reforms.
- I. There is **no** "one size fits all" prescription.
- **III.** International **cooperation** remains key.


Against the backdrop of recent trends and underlying drivers of capital flows, the **Covid-19** crisis illustrates how **policy responded** to materializing risks.

Policies that address short-term vulnerabilities are no substitutes for long-term reforms.



II. There is no "one-size-fits-all" prescription

Definition and purpose: explicitly designed to limit capital flows and reduce domestic financial risks.



I. There is no "one-size-fits-all" prescription



- **MPMs most effective** to complement other policy tools.
- Impossible trinity: small open economies often use a combination of CFMs, MPMs, FX intervention to strengthen monetary policy autonomy.
- **IMF Integrated Policy Framework** that jointly considers role of monetary policy, FX intervention, MPMs and CFMs is a significant contribution.



Challenges & Complexities

- Coordination. Who decides, who implements policies?
- **Communication.** How to communicate multiple objectives related to a mix of policy tools?
- Can models provide useful insights for reality?
- How to identify shocks that inform the design of policies?

Optimal policy combination depends on nature of the shock and circumstances of each country.

III. International cooperation remains key

- 1) The **pipes** channelling capital are **interconnected** and operate globally.
- 2) Local policy actions affecting these pipes have **global implications**.
- 3) Critical role of the GFSN in preventing and mitigating the effects of crises
 - International reserves
 - Regional Financing Arrangements
 - Swap lines
 - Repo facilities
 - IMF Lending Facilities



The **Covid-19** crisis illustrates how **policy responded** to materializing risks



Push: Global risk aversion accentuated volatility.

Pull factors: countries with weaker fundamentals were most affected.

Pipes: Pro-cyclical behavior of NBFIs, contagious outflows and volatility, eg triggered by index tracking.

AEs: sharply reduced interest rates, APPs, FLS, special liquidity facilities.

EMEs: similar to AEs+ FX intervention

GFSN:

Swap lines and repo facilities eased funding pressures. Some countries accessed IMF programs. Turnaround benefitting from riskappetitegivenlooseglobalfinancialconditionsandoptimismaboutvaccinedevelopments.



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Annex. Policy issues and lessons

Tool	Benefits & side effects	Character pre-emptive/reactive	Effectiveness	Interactions
Monetary Policy	+Primary tool to foster price stability, affect financial conditions and economic cycle -Applies at an aggregate level.	P: reduce inflationary pressures. R: support exchange rate	Central Banks prefer not to use monetary policy to address capital flows.	Interacts with FX policy (mainly in EM).
Micro- prudential	+Enhances resilience of individual institutions. - Incentivizes expansion abroad.	Pre-emptive		Strengthens other structural policies.
Macro prudential	+Target specific sectors of financial system, control excessive foreign currency lending, and rapid credit expansion -Suboptimal allocation of resources, stunt market development, growth of non-bank credit.	Pre-emptive	Effective for mitigating excessive volatility from credit growth. Most effective to complement other policies.	Complements FX and CFMs.
FX Intervention	+ Restore market functioning, prevent extreme movements feeding into inflation -Impairs FX market development, misalignment of exchange rate.	P: Reserve accumulation R: restore market functioning.	Depends on adequate execution and communication, consistency with other objectives.	Strengthens monetary policy autonomy.
GFSN	 +Financial support to prevent crisis or mitigate its effects. - Debate on whether GFSN is strong enough. 	P: buildup of reserves, FCL, swap lines, RFAs. R: IMF programs		Strengthens structural policies, facilitates economic adjustment.