Policy mix in a small open economy with commodity prices

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Global introduction

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- Large shocks can be addressed by both fiscal and monetary institutions. We focus our interest on studying the policy-mix consequences for a small open emerging economy, such as Mexico.

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  - The sensitivity of tax revenue to economic activity, due to the oil-prices volatility, is higher in EMEs exporting commodities (Corsetti et. al 2011).

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  - Financial markets that are less liquid, are more sensible to an increase in oil price (Chatziantoniou 2014).  
  - The sensitivity of tax revenue to economic activity, due to the oil-prices volatility, is higher in EMEs exporting commodities (Corsetti et. al 2011).
  - Large fiscal imbalances may affect exchange rates through a risk premium channel (Giorgianni 1997).

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Default is extremely likely to happen if these mix of policies are active (Leeper 1991, 2016, Uribe 2006, Bi 2012).

Hence, there ought to be an even deeper need of coordination between fiscal and monetary policy in emerging economies (Aktas et al. 2010).
This article analyzes the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy for a small open economy that relies on exporting commodities.

We model how changes in the reference interest rate impact fiscal variables, as well as how monetary policy reacts to changes in the fiscal stance.

The main channel through which these policies interact is the risk premium, which is endogenously determined.

Additionally, we assess the consequences of three simultaneous shocks related to the Covid-19 pandemic, a decrease in oil price, an increase in risk-premium and a decrease in economic activity.
We use a semi-structural model estimated and calibrated for Mexico using data from 2001 to 2017.

- Total exports of Mexican economy represented almost 40% of GDP in 2019, of which 17% are commodities.
- Government owns the main firm allowed to exploit oil (PEMEX). From 1990 to 2019, oil revenues represented around 6% GDP and 28% of government revenue.

After the Great Financial Crisis and Covid-19 related shocks...

- Public revenues and debt linked to oil industry have been negatively affected, due to the sharp fall in oil prices.
- The downgrade of PEMEX’s debt rating, thus increasing the country risk premium.
Introduction: Main policy lessons

- Including a fiscal block to a standard monetary semi-structural model implies change in how the monetary authority reacts to different kind of shocks, particularly to an oil price shock.

- Monetary policy reacts countercyclically to most fiscal related shocks, including an oil-price or exchange rate shock, whereas it reacts procyclically in presence of a risk premium shock.
  - **Oil price shock**: changes in public revenues have a stronger effect on economic activity than either, the exchange rate and risk premium mechanisms.
  - **Risk premium shock**: Inflationary pressures from currency depreciation are stronger than the effects of the implied decrease in the economic activity.

- In the face of the three main shocks observed during the recent pandemic event, the best policy is a coordinated countercyclical monetary and fiscal response.
  - Smoothing effects on economic activity, while inflation is barely deviating from its target relative to the other policy combinations.
The model consists of three blocks

- An exogenous external sector models the US economy and international oil prices as VAR processes.
- A fiscal policy block models the fiscal deficit that depends on:
  - Economic activity.
  - State-owned oil company whose debt and revenue enters in public accounts.
  - The dynamics of public debt, both domestic and foreign components.
  - A fiscal rule is assumed whereby the deficit, as a percentage of GDP, has an upper bound.
- A monetary policy block:
  - A Taylor rule, including an inflation target, disciplines the response of the central bank to both the fiscal block and exogenous shocks.
The model: Fiscal Block - Revenue

Built upon the public finances framework in Mexico.

- Public sector revenue ($\tau_t$) is composed of: tax revenue ($\tau_t^{tax}$), oil revenue ($\tau_t^{oil}$), government agencies and business’ revenues ($\tau_t^{ab}$), and other type of revenue ($\tau_t^{others}$).
- Tax revenue depends on economic activity ($x_t$). Oil revenues depend on WTI price in US dollars ($wti_t$), the real exchange rate ($s_t$), and the oil production platform ($x_t^{oil}$).

$$\tau_t^{tax} = \nu_1 x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^{tax}$$

$$\tau_t^{oil} = \lambda_1 wti_t + \lambda_2 x_t^{oil} + \lambda_3 s_t + \varepsilon_t^{oil}$$

with $\nu_1$ the average share of income collected by the government. Parameters in (2) capture the structure through which PEMEX contributes to public revenue. $\varepsilon_t^{tax}$, and $\varepsilon_t^{oil}$ are exogenous shocks.
The model: Fiscal Block - Debt

- The government debt $b_t$ is divided into a domestic, $b^d_t$, and a foreign, $b^f_t$, components. It evolves according to the public sector budget constraint.

\[
 b_t = b^d_t + b^f_t; \quad \text{where:} \]

\[
 b_t = \kappa_1 b^d_{t-1} + \mu_1 b^f_{t-1} + \mu_2 s_t + (\mu_3 + \kappa_2) psbr_t + \varepsilon^d_t + \varepsilon^f_t \quad (4)
\]

$\mu_2$ is the sensitivity of the foreign debt to real exchange rate, $\mu_3$ and $\kappa_2$ the proportion that each debt finance the actual deficit ($psbr_t$), being measured by the Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR).

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$$b_t = \kappa_1 b_{t-1}^d + \mu_1 b_{t-1}^f + \mu_2 s_t + (\mu_3 + \kappa_2) psbr_t + \varepsilon_t^{B^d} + \varepsilon_t^{B^f}$$

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- PSBR is the widest measure of the public deficit:\(^2\)

$$psbr_t = d_t + FC_t + \varepsilon_t^{PSBR}$$

by considering the primary deficit ($d_t$), the public debt service ($FC_t$), including a exogenous shock $\varepsilon_t^{PSBR}$.

\(^2\)The PSBR target is set at 2.5% of GDP.
The model: Fiscal Block - Policy Rule

- The fiscal rule works through primary public spending $g_t$.

$$g_t = \psi_1 g_{t-1} - (1 - \psi_1) \psi_2 psbr_t + \varepsilon^g_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

(6) aims to stabilize the PSBR at its equilibrium level. The government gradually stabilizes its accounts since it seeks to smooth changes in spending, as alternatives are costly (e.g. fiscal reform requires a change in the regulations).
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- The country risk premium $\gamma_t$ is influenced by fiscal and monetary blocks.

\[ \gamma_t = \xi_1 \gamma_{t-1} + \xi_2 \mathbb{E}(\gamma_{t+1}) + \xi_3 psbr_t + \varepsilon_t^\gamma. \]  \hspace{1cm} (7)

We use EMBI-G index for $\gamma_t$ that is the Emerging Market Bond Index Global elaborated by JP Morgan. It includes PEMEX debt.
The monetary block follows a DSGE-VAR structure (DelNegro and Schorfheide 2006).

- The IS equation is given by:

\[ x_t = \alpha_1 x_{t-1} + \alpha_2 E_t(x_{t+1}) - \alpha_3 r_t + \alpha_4 s_t + \alpha_5 g_t^p - \alpha_6 \tau_t \]
\[ - \alpha_7 Y_t + \alpha_8 x_t^US + \varepsilon_t^x \]  

(8)
The model: Monetary Block - IS and PC

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- \alpha_7 \gamma_t + \alpha_8 x_t^{US} + \varepsilon_t^x
\]  

(8)

- The Phillips Curve with backward and forward looking components is:

\[
\pi_t = \beta_1 \pi_{t-1} + (1 - \beta_1) E_t(\pi_{t+1}) + \beta_2 x_t + \beta_3 s_t + \varepsilon_t^\pi
\]  

(9)

where \(\varepsilon_t^x\) and \(\varepsilon_t^\pi\) are exogenous shocks.
The model: Monetary Block-UIP and Taylor Rule

- The real exchange rate evolution is conditioned upon an UIP condition:

\[
s_t = (1 - \gamma_1) s_{t-1} + \gamma_1 E_t (s_{t+1}) - \gamma_2 r_t + \gamma_3 r_{t}^{US} + \gamma_4 \mathcal{Y}_t + \varepsilon_t^s \tag{10}
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(10)

- The central bank sets the nominal policy interest rate, \( i_t \), through a Taylor Rule:

\[ i_t = \rho \pi_{t-1} + \delta_1 \pi^g_t + \delta_2 x_t + \varepsilon_t^i \]  

(11)

where the rule has a forward-looking component of inflation, given that the monetary policy is conducted with a time lag. The inflation gap, \( \pi^g_t \), is defined by the expected inflation gap and the current level of inflation:

\[ \pi^g_t = \rho_{\pi} \mathbb{E}_t (\pi^g_{t+1}) + \pi_t \]  

(12)

The inflation gap depends on the difference between current inflation and the central bank objective.
To assess the performance of economic policies, we exogenously deviate from our baseline scenario. We consider two policy mix scenarios and use the resulting social losses to assess their performance.

- The social loss function is given by:

\[ L^S = \sum_{t}^{30} \beta^t \left[ \rho x_t^2 + (1 - \rho) \pi_t^2 \right] \]  

(13)

where we assume that \( \rho = 0.5 \).

- This equal weight allows us to compare both policies, by not putting a preference on stabilizing inflation nor on stabilizing output gap.
In order to capture the model mechanisms, we analyze impulse response function. Therefore, we choose to study separately the effects of higher public spending, a decrease in oil price and an increase in risk-premium shock.

For the monetary block, we examine the effects of domestic currency depreciation, and an increase in the policy interest rate.
Model mechanisms: Public Spending and Risk Premium Shocks

- **Increase in public spending**
  - Inflationary pressures are driven by the depreciation and the increase in the output gap.
    - Increases demand at the cost of worsening both the primary deficit and the PSBR.
    - Increases country risk premium and the nominal exchange rate depreciates.
  - Monetary authority increases short-term nominal interest rate to anchor inflation expectations and stabilize output gap.
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- **Increase in country premium**
  - Traduced into a negative demand shock and an exchange rate depreciation.
  - To achieve fiscal target, public spending should decrease so that primary surplus could be reached.
  - The central bank increases short-term nominal interest rate to anchor inflation expectations.
Model mechanisms: Oil price shock

- **Decrease in oil price**
  - Decreases public sector revenues and therefore increases the risk premium, and depreciates the exchange rate.
  - Fiscal policy should be restrictive, reducing economic activity.
  - Inflation decreases, given the dominating effect of lower public revenues, compared to the inflationary effect of the currency depreciation.
  - Central bank reacts reducing short-term nominal interest rate.
Model mechanisms: Real exchange rate and Monetary policy shocks

- **Domestic currency depreciation**
  - Stimulates aggregate demand due to an increase in net exports (price competitiveness).
  - Monetary policy tightens to accommodate the shock.
  - The latter increases PSBR. Therefore, government spending decreases to achieve the fiscal target.

- Increase in policy interest rate
  - Through the UIP condition, domestic currency appreciates.
  - Monetary conditions tightening reduces output gap and inflationary pressures.
  - The latter reduces tax collection and increases borrowing costs which worsen public deficit, augmenting risk premium.
  - Fiscal authority decreases public spending inducing a reduction in the deficit to accommodate this shock.

Note that monetary policy shocks affect fiscal policy stance and vice-versa, suggesting the need for coordinated policies.
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Note that monetary policy shocks affect fiscal policy stance and vice-versa, suggesting the need for coordinated policies.
We estimate the qualitative consequences of shocks that have been observed during Covid-19 pandemic (risk premium, aggregate demand and oil prices) in the baseline scenario where the monetary policy responds counter-cyclically. We examine two additional policy-mix coordinations:

- First, exogenously, fiscal authority adopts a counter-cyclical approach while monetary authority responds pro-cyclically.
- Fiscal and monetary authorities coordinate to respond counter-cyclically to shocks.

In the baseline scenario, we calibrate risk premium, oil price and the aggregate demand shocks so that, in the first period, those variables simultaneously deviate from their historical mean as seen in the two first quarters of 2020.
Figure: IRFs for the two first quarters 2020
Baseline scenario

- **Fiscal Block**
  - Falling oil prices and economic activity reduce tax revenues; that is, primary deficit worsens.
  - The increase in the risk premium increases debt service, and then PSBR, which depreciates domestic currency. The possibility of a counter-cyclical fiscal policy is constrained and, furthermore, a decrease in public spending is needed to stabilize debt.

- **Monetary Block**
  - The lack of demand pressures lowers inflation, despite the domestic currency depreciation.
  - Monetary authority thus decreases short-term policy interest rate.

To accommodate these shocks and achieve their targets, fiscal policy should respond pro-cyclically and monetary policy counter-cyclically.
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Coordinated policies scenario

Both authorities counter-cyclically react to the three shocks to stabilize the economy.

- **Fiscal Block**
  - Due to lower activity, public spending increases PSBR, yielding higher risk premium and depreciating domestic currency.
  - However, the lower nominal interest rate reduces debt service, due to the accommodative monetary policy.
Coordinated policies scenario

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- **Monetary Block**
  - The increase in risk premium and the depreciation of the real exchange rate are smaller than in the counter-cyclical fiscal policy scenario.
  - Despite a higher real exchange rate relative to the baseline scenario, the lack of demand pressures still dominates inflation behavior, allowing a lower policy interest rate.

The costs from the counter-cyclical fiscal policy are lower when both policies are coordinated. The coordinated policies generate the lower social loss compared to the two others scenario.
Policy Mix or Coordination

Policy Evaluation: discounted sum of squared output gap and inflation deviations.

Figure: Social costs for the two first quarters of 2020
Monetary policy counter-cyclically reacts to oil-price and exchange rate shocks, while for a country risk premium shock, monetary policy reacts pro-cyclically.

For an oil-price shock, variations in public revenues moves positively with economic activity, being the strongest transmission channel in our model for determining inflation.

After a country risk-premium shock, inflationary pressures due to the currency depreciation dominate the deflationary consequences from the lower economic activity.

The optimal policy would be a counter-cyclical coordinated monetary and fiscal response.

- This policy mix smooths adverse effects on economic activity, while inflation barely deviates from its target relative to other scenarios.
Possible extensions

- A plausible extension would be to generate forecasts of the variables in levels, as well as a shock decomposition analysis.
Figure: IRFs for the first quarter 2020
Figure: Social costs for the 1st quarter of 2020