

Systemic Stress Testing and Central Clearing Interdependencies

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Fifth Annual Risk Management Conference: Examining Regulatory Initiatives

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The New Systemic Risk

Three CCP failures in the past (Paris, Kuala Lumpur and Hong Kong)

Interest by regulators, CCPs and members.


Especially with tie in to Cyber, IT and other operational risks.

"They [CCPs] are not equipped, however, to test the impact of their failure on the financial system as a whole nor are they equipped to assess the potential contagion effect on other members of a given member's failure."


Cox & Steigerwald (2018)

Agenda

1) Interconnectedness **across** CCPs **within** a CCP



2) Interconnectedness



3) Simulation & Stress Testing




Interconnectedness in the Global System of CCPs

www.fna.fi

Comparison with BIS "Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies" (2018)

	BIS (2018)	FNA (2018)
CCPs	26	29
Clearing Members	n/a	813
Parent Organizations	306	495
Roles	7 (member, settlement, LOC,)	1 (member)

Private vs Public Data



FNA (2018)

BIS (2018)

CCP Interconnectedness - Subsidiary Level


We see CCPs (diamonds) and their members (circles) from different regions:

Horizon Securities CO., LTD.



- Europe and Middle East (orange)
- Asia and Pacific (green)
- Latin America (light blue)
- Africa (red)

On subsidiary level, we see a tight core with peripheral CCPs and a number of completely disconnected CCPs from Latin America and Middle East.





edicorp Capital Colombia S.A.




Banking Groups

210 Banking Groups

Largest (# of entities):

- 1. Citigroup (18)
- 2. Morgan Stanley (13)
- 3. Goldman Sachs (12)
- 4. JPMorgan Chase (12)
- 5. Bank of America (12)
- 6. HSBC (11)
- 7. UBS (11)
- 8. Deutsche Bank (10)
- 9. Credit Suisse (10)
- 10. Nomura Holdings (9)




CCP Interconnectedness on Parent Level

We see CCPs (diamonds) and their members (circles) from different regions:

- North America (blue)
- Europe and Middle East (orange)
- Asia and Pacific (green)
- Latin America (light blue)
- Africa (red)

On parent level we see a completely connected network dominated by a core consisting of CCPs from North America and Europe and global banks.




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
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


CCP Interconnectedness on Subsidiary vs Parent Level - Example




CCP Interconnectedness on GSIB Level

Bank (Parent)	# of CCPs	
Citigroup	22	
Deutsche Bank	21	
JPMorgan Chase & Co.	20	
BNP Paribas	19	
Bank of America	18	
HSBC	17	
Societe Generale	17	
UBS	16	
Morgan Stanley	16	
Credit Suisse	15	



Contagion - CCP Disruption

A disruption in a CCP would affect all of that CCP's clearing members, thereby affecting the other CCP's to which the affected CCP's members belong, possibly creating a cascading cycle as disruption is propagated across members and CCPs




Footprint of CCPs - OCC

OCC's 79 members are connected to 27 other CCPs

The membership is mostly US with a significant EU base.

The most connected CCP's are DTCC and CME.




Footprint of CCPs - CME

CME's 58 members are connected to 27 other CCPs

The membership is mostly US with few entries from Europe and Asia

The most connected CCP are ICE US, ICE Europe, LCH Ltd. and OCC




Footprint of CCPs - ICE

ICE's 36 members are connected to 27 other CCPs

The membership is mostly US with a significant European base.


The most connected CCPs are CME, ICE EUROPE and OCC




A member disruption could be felt by up to **448** banking groups or banks (of total of 495, or 90%) that are members of the same CCP as the stricken group.

Banking Group	# banking groups connected via a CCP
Citigroup	448
BNP Paribas	426
JPMorgan Chase	396
Deutsche Bank	392
Bank of America	391
Morgan Stanley	378
Credit Suisse	357
Société Générale	351
Goldman Sachs	349
HSBC Holdings	339

Contagion – Member Disruption



Contagion – Member Disruption



Objective: Develop a global database and the methods to measure risk concentrations and simulate failures and stress scenarios of interconnected FMIs and markets. This will allow regulators, FMIs and members develop risk mitigation strategies to address this new and global systemic risk.

Data Collection	Data augmentation	Analysis & Visualization	Simulation	Monitoring
Collect data. Collect data on CCPs/FMIs from quantitative disclosures and other public data sources	Fill missing pieces. Use CCP/FMI specific data & new statistical techniques to estimate missing data.	See patterns. Identify unexpected patterns. Build intuition. Identify risk concentrations.	Test hypothesis. Carry out 'what if' scenarios.	Monitor risk. Ongoing update of database & facilities to monitor risks.

Short History of Payment System Simulations

1997 : Bank of Finland

Evaluate liquidity needs of banks when Finland's RTGS system was joining TARGET First general purpose payment systems simulator

2000 : Bank of Japan and FRBNY

Test liquidity saving mechanisms (LSM) for BoJ-Net & Fedwire

2001 - : CLS approval process and ongoing oversight

Test CLS risk management Evaluate settlement' members capacity for pay-ins Understand how the system works

Since then: Bank of Canada, Banque de France, Nederlandsche Bank, Norges Bank, TARGET2, and many others

2018 : Exact replicas of LVTS, CHAPS and 4 other FMIs in FNA

Three main use cases:

- Liquidity optimization
- Liquidity stress testing
- What-if Analysis



Interconnectedness within a CCP

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Concept: Operational Failure of a Settlement Member

Mapping

This network shows settlement relationships between the:

- CCP (center)
- Settlement members (inner circle) and
- Clearing members (outer circle)


Note: Data is representative, not real

Size of node shows value of multilateral position

Width of lines shows value of bilateral positions

Question

What would happen if member 4 had an operational failure?




Backup Relationships

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Shows Clearing Members on the left, and Settlement Members on the right.

The lines denote which settlement member the clearing member can use for settlement (ie its main and its backups)



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
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What would happen if member 4 had an operational failure?



Rewiring for Maximum Concentration

Each clearing member using Bank 4 must now effect settlement through one of its backup relationships.


Findings

Simulation shows that settlement flows could be concentrated on a few participants, e.g.

causing operational challenges for Bank 11.

Insight

Bank 11 was not among the most active settlement members on a normal day, but might need to build operational capacity to cover for rare failure days.




Rewiring for Minimum Concentration

Findings


... or clearing members might use different settlement members resulting in a much higher number (18 instead of 10) of settlement members for the day.

Insight

The CCP may need to build operational capacity to be able to complete settlement.



The Vision - Simulate System of FMIs



Visualizations

The visualizations were created for FIA MarketVoice article :

"<u>Mapping Clearing Interdependencies and</u> <u>Systemic Risk: How network theory can</u> <u>illuminate the topography of clearing risk</u>"

Links to interactive versions are available on <u>FNA Website</u> and in the following slides.



By Kimmo Soramäki and Samantha Cook

Global regulators are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of market infrastructures in the systemic risk topography. In particular, regulators are ecognizing the need to understand the interconnections between clearinghouses and their members, which have the potential to transmit the shocks from a default or operational incident in unexpected ways. In this article, two experts on network theory show how this type of data analytics can provide regulators and market participants with a better understanding of the connections within the global clearing system.

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