Agent-based modeling in finance

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Historical context for agent-based economics

Classical and neo-classical building blocks

- Early macroeconomics focuses on coarse aggregates
 - GDP, savings, investment, money supply, etc.
 - Price level, aggregate output, IS-LM
 - Unique Arrow-Debreu price vector
- Rational (homogeneous) behavior
 - Common information sets (e.g., public prices, economic aggregates)
 - Constrained maximization of utility or profits

Microfoundations of exchange

- Heterogeneity
 - Diversity of beliefs, idiosyncratic information sets
 - Principal-agent problems, networks, distributed control
 - Decentralized markets, diversity of prices, limits to arbitrate
- Alternatives to strictly rational behavior
 - Noise traders, bounded rationality, behavioral economics
 - Game theory, strategic interaction, feedback dynamics

Origins

Biology

- Self-replicating automata
 - John von Neumann
- Game of Life
 - John Conway

Economics

- Satisficing decision model
 - Richard Cyert, James March, and Herbert Simon
- Tipping point model
 - Tom Schelling

Computer science

- Artificial intelligence (AI)
- Robotics
- Object-oriented programming



Schelling's endogenous segregation (tipping point model)

Image source: bookdown.org

Example - Conway's Game of Life

- Dynamics of the "life" state of cells in a grid
- State change depends on the state of neighboring cells
 - **Underpopulation** Live cell with fewer than 2 live neighbors dies
 - Survival Live cell with 2 or 3 live neighbors survives
 - **Overpopulation** Live cell with 4+ live neighbors dies
 - **Reproduction** Dead cell with 3 live neighbors is reborn



"Beacon" dynamic in the Game of Life

What are agent-based models (ABMs)?

Collection of agents, interacting to generate system behavior

- Purposive preferences, with behavior seeking preferred outcomes
- (Semi-)autonomous internal state and behavioral rules
 - May respond to local or system-wide events and actions
 - Object-oriented programming
- Interactive agents respond to one another
 - Also possibly respond to social/environmental stimuli

Agents' behaviors can range widely

- Zero intelligence traders
 - Budget constraints alone generate meaningful patterns
- Bounded rationality
 - Sophisticated strategies can over-adapt to transient state (brittle)
- Agent learning/adaptive behavior
 - Genetic programming e.g., Arifovic (1996); Chen and Yeh (2001)

ABMs are not computational economics / finance / game theory



What are ABMs?

System behavior

- We are typically interested in an ill-defined task
 - Example: convert market data to portfolio decisions
- Globally optimal, rational behavior is unclear
 - May require strong assumptions with weak support
- Specify local satisficing behavior instead
 - System behavior may be invariant wrt local behavior

Emergence



Formal neighborhood Defines permissible local interactions

- System properties that are not characteristic of individual agents
 - The whole is not the sum of the parts (fallacy of composition)
 - Example: invisible hand of market equilibrium
- Population dynamics
 - New generations of agents can descend from ancestors' interactions
- Heterogeneity vive la différence
 - Parameterize (and experiment over) a distribution of beliefs, strategies, etc.
 - Or allow heterogeneity to emerge endogenously

Complexity

Complex adaptive systems:

- Reproduction including artificial life
- Self-organization and emergence
- <u>Self-organized criticality</u>
- Evolutionary computation

Emergence



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Advantages

Rationality is difficult to justify

- Representative agent models overemphasize model tractability
 - Mathematical aggregation requires restrictive (Procrustean) assumptions
 - Model results as point estimates, not distributions
- ABMs use heuristics and bounded rationality instead
 - Resort to simulation in lieu of closed-form solution
- Formal results on learning and rationality
 - Learning to be rational is computationally NP-hard and game-theoretically impossible
 - Agent automata resolve this through procedural rationality (Simons) plausible mechanisms for behavior at the agent level

ABMs have different emphases from representative-agent models

- Heterogeneous agents
 - Focus on distribution of behavior instead of average behavior
- Local interactions
 - Microfoundations for learning, information propagation, equilibrium formation
- System dynamics
 - Analysis of paths to equilibrium and nonequilibrium processes

Challenges

Robustness

- Artefacts of software implementation
 - Bugs
 - Dependence on parameters
 - Parameter sweeps → curse of dimensionality
- Dependence on interaction model
 - Random versus sequential interaction
 - Network topology for interaction neighborhoods
- Lack of standards
 - Code publication and documentation
 - Integration of tools from different software packages / frameworks
 - Publication of results

Estimation / calibration

- Many calibration techniques available
- Challenge afflicts traditional economic theory too
- Ecological inference drawing conclusions about individuals from aggregates
 - Manski critique applied to local interactions

Reduced-form heterogeneous agent models

General structure of HAMs

- Heterogeneous agents
 - Often two behavioral categories (e.g., informed vs. noise, or fundamentalist vs. chartist)
 - Typical distinction is between regressive (fundamentalist) and extrapolative (chartist) beliefs
 - Switching of group membership possible
- Bounded rationality
 - Frequently using closed-form mathematical solutions simulation not required

Microfoundations for market anomalies

- Underpinning for stylized facts about financial markets
 - Discrete-time models of bubbles and crashes <u>Brock and Hommes (1997)</u>
 - Continuous-time models of market stability <u>He and Li (2012)</u>
 - Price/return dynamics of multiple risky assets Westerhoff (2004)
 - Housing price boom-bust cycles Bolt, et al. (2019)
 - Securities market microstructure Chiarella, Iori and Perelló (2009)
- Price specifications are central
 - Price changes or simple returns are often the sole input
 - Other factors often ignored e.g., trading volume, order flow

Chartists and fundamentalists

Basic framework

$$\Delta P_t = \alpha + \beta_{\varphi} \varphi_t (P_{t-1} - P_{t-1}^*) + \beta_{\chi} \chi_t \Delta P_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

- Fundamentalists are "regressive" focus on (P_{t-1} P*)
 - Chartists appear in proportion ϕ
- Chartists are extrapolative follow recent price trends ΔP_{t-1}
 - Chartists appear in proportion χ
- Switching between types may be possible
 - Proportions φ and χ can vary over time
- Several parameters control system dynamics
 - Structural parameters α , β_{φ} , β_{χ}
 - Probability distribution for ${\ensuremath{arepsilon}}$
 - Additional parameters, for example governing switching

Example: Destabilizing rational speculation

J. B. DeLong, A. Shleifer, L. Summers and R. Waldmann (1990) "Positive feedback investment strategies and destabilizing rational speculation," J. of Finance, 45(2), 379-395.

Two types of traders

- Rational informed investors
 - Receive a signal in $\{-\varphi, 0, +\varphi\}$
 - Signal may be noisy
- Positive feedback traders
 - No signal
 - Follow the trend

Equilibrium prices and expectations rationality



What is "rationality"?

- Should rational investors adapt to the behavior of trend followers?
- If so, their behavior magnifies the positive feedback

Example: Volatility clustering

A. Kirman (1991), "Epidemics of opinion and speculative bubbles in financial markets," In M. Taylor (ed.), Money and Financial Markets, Blackwell.

Foreign exchange market

- Heterogeneous traders
 - Optimists expect appreciation
 - Pessimists expect depreciation
- Traders meet at random
 - Probability $(1-\delta)$ that trader A converts the beliefs of trader B



Example: Bank fire sales

R. Cifuentes, G. Ferrucci and H. S. Shin (2005), "Liquidity risk and contagion," J. of the *European Economic Association*, 3(2-3), 556-566.

Interbank lending market

- Many banks with default risk
 - Interbank loans
 - Other marketable assets
- Contagion
 - Default propagation
 - Fire sales of other assets
- Equilibrium
 - Limited liability of equityholders
 - Meet capital requirement or fail
 - Price impact of asset sales
- Structure
 - Interconnections interbank loans
 - Initial default
 - Iterative propagation



Image: Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin (2005)

Model calibration / estimation

Importance of calibration

- ABMs tend to be heavily parameterized
 - Many degrees of freedom = Ability to generate many outcomes
- With great power comes great responsibility
 - Calibration constrains the model to be realistic
 - A statement of how the world works, not how you think about the problem

Estimation methods

- Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
- Method of moments
 - Generalized method of moments (GMM)
 - Simulated method of moments (SMM)
- Latent variables
 - State space models
 - Particle filtering
- Bayesian methods
 - Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
 - Metropolis-Hastings

Implementation

Object-oriented programming

- Classes (e.g., chartists) with each instance an agent
 - Methods defining behavior
 - Instance variables for agent state and parameters
 - Population of agents as a separate object
- Interaction framework more classes and objects
 - Neighborhood topology
 - Interaction mechanism (e.g., search, preferential, random)
 - Agent activation and reproduction

Housekeeping

- Logging
- Storing result ensembles
- User display

Implementation

Agent-based modeling and simulation tools

- <u>Swarm</u> (Objective C, Java)
- <u>NetLogo</u> and StarLogo
- <u>Repast</u> (Java)
- MASON (Java)
- <u>AScape</u>
- MESA (Python)
- HARK (Python)



Reading Suggestions

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- U. Wilensky and W. Rand (2015), <u>An Introduction to Agent-based Modeling: Modeling natural, social and</u> <u>engineered complex systems with NetLogo</u>, MIT Press.

Thanks!